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PROPOSITIONS 
defended in the dissertation 
THE DOUBLE LIFE OF PROBABILITY 
A Philosophical Study of Chance and Credence 
Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz 
 
1. Various principles relating chances to credences, prior chances to posterior 
chances, and prior credences to posterior credences provide a fruitful way of 
theorizing about chance and credence. 
 
2. We can master the concept of chance by analysing the roles it plays in our 
life. (chapter 2) 
 
3. Under certain conditions, the expert role of chance codified in David Lewis’s 
Principal Principle – a particular principle relating chance and credence – 
demands chance to be a finitely additive probability function. (chapter 2) 
 
4. Principles relating prior and posterior chances follow from a plausible norm 
for chances that requires chance distributions to maximize resiliency upon 
variation of experimental factors. So-called Humean accounts of chance 
should be treated with caution insofar as they allow chances to violate those 
principles. (chapter 3)  
 
5. The evolution of chance through time can be modelled as conditionalization 
on the intervening history of events. Under fairly plausible conditions, this 
model is equivalent to a principle relating prior and posterior chances. 
Chances that obey this principle maximize resiliency upon variation of 
intervening histories. (chapter 4) 
 
6. Statistical evidence is conducive to the achievement of both verdict and 
credence accuracy in legal proceedings. A particular principle relating a fact-
finder’s credences with evidence about chance can be supported by appealing 
to a fairly plausible idea of accuracy in legal fact-finding. (chapter 5) 
 
7. Updating by the principle of maximum relative entropy does not always lead 
to new credences that are expected to be helpful, and never harmful in 
making decisions. (chapter 6)   
